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maximize the gains and best ameliorate
the costs of the changes brought about
by technology and trade. 
■ The Two Sides of 
Global Sourcing from a
Manufacturing Perspective
Because the globalization of services is
just beginning, we don’t yet know for
sure how much we stand to gain from it,
but we can expect to gain plenty if the
gains from the globalization of manufac-
turing are any guide. Research using very
detailed plant-level data, summarized in 
a short book by Howard Lewis and J.
David Richardson, shows that global
engagement through trade and invest-
ment has been very advantageous for
U.S. workers and firms.1 First, workers
and companies that export have 
0.6–1.3 percent faster sales growth and
2–4 percent faster employment growth,
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The U.S. service sector is in the midst
of a transformation similar to the one
undergone by the manufacturing 
sector. Some jobs are moving to other
countries, some are disappearing,
some are being born. But the service-
sector transformation is likely to be
different. Technological advances and
globalization are making it possible,
but these factors reinforce each other
in such a way that the gains to the
U.S. economy are likely to be greater
than with manufacturing, and the
transition costs more widespread.
Thus, superior and better coordi-
nated domestic and international
policies are needed to address the
challenges and opportunities.
Globalization, always a contentious
issue, has become even more so with
media reports of U.S. service-sector jobs
being outsourced to emerging-market
economies, such as call center opera-
tions to Ireland or programming jobs to
India. Traditionally, these jobs have been
considered “nontradable” and therefore
safe from the competitive forces of
international trade and investment. But
increasingly, technological advances are
making it easier to buy services from
other companies, even those in develop-
ing countries, where savings in the cost
of labor or the opportunity to use the 24-
hour clock to speed product develop-
ment can be irresistible. 
Both technological advances and global-
ization cause dislocations of domestic
labor. They also generate great gains to
the U.S. economy. But technology and
trade have become so interdependent and
mutually reinforcing that it is increas-
ingly difficult, and in some sense mean-
ingless, to try to separate out which is the
cause of any given gain or loss. Because
technology and trade reinforce each
other, deeper global integration and
increased worldwide sourcing of prod-
ucts and services have the potential to
generate greater gains, and greater adjust-
ment challenges, than either technology
or international trade alone have before. 
Existing research, mostly on the manu-
facturing sector, shows well the two
sides of globalization. The positive side
is well-touted—lower prices and greater
variety of consumer goods and business
inputs; innovation and efficiency from
the discipline of foreign competition;
technology transfer and new ideas from
global markets. Ultimately, the produc-
tivity growth that results creates higher-
value products, supports higher wages,
and raises employment. These gains
from trade result when firms change
what they produce and the way they pro-
duce it in response to competition, tech-
nology, and opportunities at home and
abroad. But these gains do not come
without dislocations: Firms go out of
business, workers lose their jobs, and
communities are hard hit. 
The Internet and information technology
more completely integrate the United
States with the rest of the world and
extend the competition for markets,
investment, and jobs from the manufac-
turing economy into the service sector.
As the U.S. and global economies
become more integrated, the gains from
trade in services will most likely be
greater, but the adjustment costs will
probably be more widespread. More-
over, our deeper integration is taking
place at a time when large players—
China, India, countries of the former
Soviet Union—are breaking onto the
international scene. Putting the two sides
of the new globalization together to
make a positive equation for U.S. work-
ers and firms is the critical challenge fac-
ing policymakers today. 
Gaining from globalization and techno-
logical change requires that businesses
and workers change what they do. 
Stopping global integration does not 
stop technological change. Policies to
promote adaptation to a changing envi-
ronment are critical even without any 
further international integration. But
because technology and trade are more
likely to go hand in hand these days, an
integrated policy approach is needed,
with businesses, workers, educators, and
the government working together tointernal functions of a firm. Once sepa-
rable from the core activity of the firm,
these activities can be outsourced. Once
outsourced, they can be offshored, that
is, done abroad if the foreign location
has the appropriate infrastructure, busi-
ness environment, and worker and firm
characteristics. Although technology is
the driving force behind the potential
globalization of these activities, the
extent of actual globalization is limited
by the characteristics of the trading
countries and the degree of fragmenta-
tion of the activity. 
How important to the United States is
the trend toward expanding trade in 
services? Without a doubt, services are
increasingly important in the U.S. econ-
omy, and increasingly important in
international engagement. Their contri-
bution to national production, interna-
tional trade, and foreign investment 
continues to grow, and the proportion of
U.S. workers engaged in this sector now
far exceeds all others combined. Ser-
vices account for 60 percent of real 
personal consumption expenditures,3
84 percent of private industry products,
about 30 percent of exports, and about
15 percent of imports. Service occupa-
tions account for about 90 percent of
employment. No wonder globalization
of services has generated concern. 
Not only are services already important
for the domestic economy, the global
integration of U.S. services is proceeding
quite rapidly. Data on cross-border ser-
vices trade show that trade transactions in
“other private services” is growing faster
than cross-border trade in goods and is
increasingly in surplus.4 Other private
services exports are growing more than
twice as fast as goods exports, and other
private services imports are growing
about 50 percent faster. The net positive
trade balance in other private services has
increased over the last dozen years, and
stands in contrast to the large and increas-
ingly negative balance of trade for goods.
Technology may well be increasing two-
way trade in these services, but the 
concern that trade of technology-enabled
services will disproportionately favor ser-
vice imports over exports is not corrobo-
rated by these data—in fact, the robust-
ness of these exports even in the face of
slow growth in major industrial markets
abroad suggests that U.S. providers of
technology-enabled services are globally
competitive.5
Meanwhile, U.S. direct investment
abroad and direct investment into the
United States are increasingly in the ser-
vice sector. Services that are enabled by
information technology, such as finance,
and offer dramatically better pay and
benefits. Exporting is the slam-dunk of
global engagement. 
But even if a firm only imports, it is
more likely to receive foreign direct
investment, which pays for advanced
manufacturing technologies, which
yield higher wages for the workers. For
each 10 percent of imported input,
worker salaries are higher by $1,000. 
This research also finds that multina-
tional groups are more robust than
domestic-only companies. Plants that are
part of a U.S.-parent multinational com-
pany have 11 percent higher labor pro-
ductivity than those that are only domes-
tic, and this higher productivity supports
a 7–15 percent wage premium (blue- and
white-collar, respectively). It is also the
case that U.S. plants that are owned by a
foreign parent are more likely to grow
faster, employ more people, use
advanced manufacturing technologies,
and have 13–19 percent higher wages
compared to domestic-only plants. 
These economywide, plant-specific, and
individual-worker gains are not without
cost. Lori Kletzer analyzed a sample of
dislocated workers, spanning a period of
21 years, and found that 17 million
workers were displaced from manufac-
turing overall and 6.4 million were dis-
placed from sectors facing particularly
high import competition, such as electri-
cal machinery, apparel, motor vehicles,
non-electrical machinery, and blast fur-
naces.2About 21 percent of workers dis-
placed from manufacturing sectors were
high school dropouts. Although about
70 percent of displaced manufacturing
workers did get a new job (about half in
their same industry), weekly earnings
were, on average, 13 percent lower. This
average masks important differences in
wage outcomes: Some workers did quite
well in their new jobs—36 percent
reported the same or higher earnings.
Others faired poorly—25 percent
reported earnings losses of 30 percent or
more. Those reporting the worst replace-
ment earnings were the older, less-
educated and lower-skilled production
workers with the longest tenure at their
old job. An important finding of 
Kletzer’s work is that among all re-
employed workers, the re-employment
experience was similar whether the job
was lost on account of imports or for
some other reason—except for the spe-
cific case of women losing jobs in the
apparel industry. So, international trade
was not the unique factor dominating
the job loss or re-employment outcome. 
A key lesson from the research on global-
ization is that the gains are large. Equally
instructive is the observation that the
adjustment costs for those who lose their
jobs are similar regardless of whether
they lose them because trade affected
their industry or for some other reason.
That this should be the case emphasizes
the need for policy to address the adjust-
ment cost of technological change, par-
ticularly in the context of upgrading of
skills in the workplace, not just the forces
of international trade. Most specifically,
policy needs to address the fact that those
with a lower level of educational attain-
ment fare worst when it comes to adapt-
ing to change.  
■ International Trade in 
Services: Why Now and How
Important for the United
States? 
What changed to make services interna-
tionally tradable, and how important
might that trend be for the U.S. econ-
omy? What changed, in short, are the
attributes of services that made them
heretofore nontradable: Services used to
involve high transactions costs and
require functional business integration.
For example, financial, legal, or adminis-
trative services have required hand-
shakes, physical presence to sign papers,
or professional licensing exams unique to
a jurisdiction. These attributes have been
eroded over time by global technological
change, local policy change, and changes
in customer and business attitudes. 
Key technological changes include the
Internet in conjunction with interna-
tional telecommunications networks,
information technology (IT) hardware
(such as personal computers), and the
digitization of activities. These tech-
nologies have created the potential for
linkages between countries and busi-
nesses that simply did not exist before. 
A second key technological innovation
has been the codification of information,
which reduces the specific knowledge
needed to perform skill- and information-
intensive tasks. For example, the on-
screen menu system in a customer 
service center replicates aspects of the
step-by-step decisionmaking process
taken by an expert, so that people with
less experience can perform these tasks
effectively. Spreadsheet software with
embedded equations, combined with the
ability to download data, means that 
people with modest financial training 
can prepare financial reports. 
All told, communications infrastructure
and codification of information make it
easier to separate many tasks from theHowever, the adjustment challenges could
be greater than experienced with manufac-
turing, not just in the United States, but in
other countries around the world. First, the
proportion of the U.S. economy in the ser-
vices sector is larger than that in manufactur-
ing—and this is true for most industrial
nations. Second, the pace of change for the
globalization of services is more rapid than
for the globalization of goods. Moreover,
because the share of services in consump-
tion rises as a country gets richer, the pace
of globalization of trade and investment in
services is likely to accelerate with faster
GDP growth here and greater economic
development abroad. Fourth, with both
trade and direct investment in services
increasing around the world, the share of
labor—both in industrial and in developing
countries—exposed to international market
forces is rising, in contrast to manufactur-
ing and agriculture, where productivity
growth is reducing the ratio of labor input
to production. 
Because the United States is on the leading
edge of the gains and adjustment chal-
lenges presaged by the globalization of ser-
vices, other countries will be looking to
our policy direction for guidance. Policies
undertaken here at home—to either
embrace trade or to try to slow it down, to
develop labor-skills policies or to ignore
worker adjustment—could affect the
potential markets abroad for U.S. trade and
investment. 
Is the policy response obvious? Unfortu-
nately, despite the sense of urgency created
by these measures of trade and technology,
we have no crystal-clear picture of the path
that the globalization of U.S. services will
take, nor of all its implications. Because the
pace of change is so brisk, that fact is not
likely to change. Even as additional data are
collected, policymakers will have only an
imperfect picture to work with.
■ Globalization on Steroids:
The IT sector 
Examining the synergies between trade and
technology in the IT sector may give
insights on both the channels for potential
gains and the nature of the policy challenges
that may be brought by the globalization of
services more generally. IT is a particularly
interesting sector in that it manifests a very
rapid pace of technological change com-
bined with the speedy global integration of
countries that have targeted the sector
through investment and skill development. 
Hard evidence on the gains from global
sourcing of IT comes from looking at pat-
terns of production, investment, and the
use of IT. In the United States in the 1990s,
FIGURE 2 UNEVEN DIFFUSION OF IT AND
UNEVEN PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
BY SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES
a.  See Economics and Statistics Administration, Department of Commerce, Digital Economy
2002, p. 34, available at <https://www.esa.doc.gov/reports/DE2002_CH4.pdf>, for an expla-
nation of how this measure was calculated.
b.  The size of the bubbles indicates the individual sector’s share of GDP.
SOURCE: Economics and Statistics Administration, Department of Commerce, Digital 
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FIGURE 1 IT INVESTMENT AND IT-RELATED
EMPLOYMENT 
NOTE: IT services consists of software publishing (NAICS category 5112), ISPs, search por-
tals and data processing (NAICS 518), and computer systems design and related services
(NAICS 5415). It does not include IT employment outside these sectors. Investment data for
2004 are the average of Q1, Q2, and Q3 final data, and 2004 employment data are the last
available data for September 2004 (p). Computer and mathematical occupations, and architec-
ture and engineering occupations are annual OES data benchmarked to the last quarter of
1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. 2003 data refer to May 2003, whereas 2004 data have been cre-
ated by growing the May 2003 OES data point by the rate of change from the CPS monthly
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insurance, information, and business
and professional services, accounted for
about one-third of the cross-border
flows of direct investment between
1999 and 2003.
Direct investment in information-
technology-enabled services is somewhat
more important coming into the United
States as compared to U.S. investment
abroad, which may be due to a more 
liberal environment for foreign invest-
ment in the United States. All told, if the 
model of manufacturing is repeated for
information-technology-enabled services,
the potential gain to the U.S. economy
could be quite great. the globalization of the IT hardware
industry resulted in U.S. IT prices some
10 to 30 percent lower than they would
have been based on domestic production
and domestic technological advances
alone.6The lower prices increased invest-
ment in IT hardware and spread its use.
Because of the general-purpose nature of
the IT product, estimates suggest that
overall price declines spurred a greater
than one-for-one increase in IT invest-
ment throughout the economy.7 Lower
prices also freed up resources for other
activities within firms, including the
important reorienting and transforming
of business activities and workplace prac-
tices that were needed to use the informa-
tion technology more effectively.8
Both the increased IT investment and the
business transformations spurred by it
raised productivity and real GDP growth
in the United States. Altogether, IT
accounted for well more than half of the
acceleration of structural productivity
growth of the 1990s, which supported
both the higher GDP growth (4 percent)
and the lower unemployment rates (3.9
percent) enjoyed by the U.S. economy in
the second half of the decade. 
The boom in IT capital investment also
spurred the hiring of IT professionals.
But the structural change in the U.S.
economy toward more intensive use 
of information technology has been
bumpy. Figure 1 shows that complemen-
tarity between IT capital and IT workers,
which worked to increase the demand for
IT workers during the technology boom,
yielded a wave of firings during the tech
bust. Nevertheless, as IT investment has
rebounded, so, too, has the demand for
workers with IT skills. 
The economywide story masks notewor-
thy differences in the diffusion of IT
across sectors in the U.S. economy,
which points to where the future gains
of the globalization of IT services and
software may come from. “Leading”
sectors, such as wholesale trade, elec-
tronic products, and financial institu-
tions, invested relatively more in IT,
whereas other sectors, such as health
services and construction, lagged in the
uptake of IT. Productivity performance
at the sector level is similarly uneven,
with the sectors with the highest invest-
ment in IT having the highest productiv-
ity growth (see figure 2). The leading
sectors also hire the bulk of IT profes-
sionals, and sectors such as finance run
international trade surpluses. So, going
hand in hand with IT intensity are gains
to productivity growth, IT jobs, and
trade surpluses. 
■ Software and IT Services: 
The Next Wave of Global 
Sourcing
Going forward, the United States is
poised for (indeed, perhaps is in the midst
of) a second wave of IT investment,
growth in IT jobs, and faster macroeco-
nomic productivity growth, as compo-
nents of software and IT services are pro-
duced more cheaply abroad as part of an
international value chain. A key source of
the gains to investment, jobs, and produc-
tivity may come from diffusion of IT into
the sectors that did not take up IT during
the 1990s. 
How does globalization of services meet
the challenges of the sectors that lagged
in the 1990s? Large sectors in the U.S.
economy, such as health services and
construction (about 5 percent of GDP
each), as well as many small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) still do
not use IT very intensively. Reasons
range from cost to culture to regulatory
Employment
Absolute change Percent change
1/99–11/03 1/99–11/03 Level 11/03 11/03
Call-center and low-wage technology workers
Call-center-type occupations1 –126.110 –22 444,500 $25,000
Low-wage technology workers2 –419,140 –33 856,720 $24,000
Total –545,260 –30 1,301,220 $25,000
Production workers in the manufacturing
sector (for comparison) –20
High-wage technology workers
Computer programmers, SOC 15-1021 –125,380 –31 403,220 $65,000
Software engineers and systems analysts3 263,980 22 1,188,820 $73,000
Database administrators, SOC 15-1061 –3,920 –4 97,540 $62,000
Network and system administrators
and analysts4 137,800 21 645,490 $65,000
Computer hardware/electrical engineers5 34,430 10 350,890 $77,000
Total 264,470 11 2,465,120 $70,000
Total CES employment
(for comparison) 1
SOURCES: Bureau of Labor Statistics , current employment statistics (CES) data, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, May 2003, and November 2003; Bureau of Labor Statistics, national occupa-
tional employment and wage estimates.
1.  Telemarketers and telephone operators (Standard occupational classification (SOC) 41-9041 and 43-2021).
2.  Switchboard operators and answering services; computer operators; data entry keyers; and word processors and typists (SOC 43-2011; 9011; 9021; and 9022).
3.  Computer software engineers, applications; computer software engineers, systems software; and computer systems analysts (SOC 15-1031; 1032; and 1051).
4.  Network and computer systems administrators; and network systems and data communications analysts (SOC 15-1071; and 1081).
5.  Computer hardware engineers; electrical engineers; and electronics engineers (SOC 17-2061; 2071; and 2072).
Wages
TABLE 1 EVOLUTION OF JOBS AND SKILLS IN SELECTED U.S. TECHNOLOGY 
OCCUPATIONS, 1999–NOVEMBER 2003constraints. For example, the culture and
business of SMEs often require more 
tailored IT applications and on-site assis-
tance. In health services, regulatory
issues are quite important for software
and services design, as is the complexity
of the relationships along the chain
of delivery of health services (doctor,
hospital, pharmacy). In construction, 
professional licensing and “stick-built”
housing construction have been the norm.
These issues have interacted with the
higher relative cost of software and ser-
vices to put IT further out of reach for
these firms. Although the hardware may
be generalized to fit many needs, ser-
vices and software are more situation-
specific. So, as hardware prices fell in
the 1990s, software and IT services
became more important, and spending
on them rose relative to hardware. In
1993, for each $1 spent on hardware,
firms in the United States spent $1.40
on software and services. But by 2000,
the ratio was $2.20 on software and ser-
vices for every $1 on hardware.9
Offshoring of some components of ser-
vices and some part of software produc-
tion should reduce the price of cus-
tomized software and services.
Because the responsiveness of demand
to the price of these products is esti-
mated to be even greater than in the
case of IT hardware, as these products
become less expensive, demand for
them will expand more than proportion-
ate to the decline in price. As a result,
the lagging sectors should be able to
afford more IT, the leading sectors
should deepen their use of it, productiv-
ity growth should rise throughout the
U.S. economy, and the demand for
workers with integrative IT skills in all
sectors should grow as well.  
Already, data point to how technology
and globalization are affecting the mix
of IT skills being demanded in the
United States (see table 1). Between
1999 and November 2003 (the time
period for which detailed data are avail-
able), the number of “programming”
jobs, earning $64,000 on average, fell
by about 125,000. But jobs held by
applications- and systems-software
engineers, database analysts, and net-
work engineers, earning $74,000 on
average, increased by some 425,000.
Thus, global sourcing of software and
services, even as it increases the num-
ber of IT jobs, changes the mix of IT
jobs—with a greater emphasis on inte-
grating imported components, and 
analyzing, designing, and implementing
IT products to meet the specific needs
of U.S. businesses. 
The effect of technology and interna-
tional trade together also can be seen 
for occupations that use IT but are less
highly skilled and pay lower wages—
around $25,000. These occupations—
telemarketers, switchboard operators,
telephone operators, computer opera-
tors, data entry keyers, word processors
and typists, and office machine opera-
tors—experienced very large job losses
(545,000) from 1999 to November
2003—a decline of about one-third of
those employed in 1999. These jobs 
are not likely to return to the United
States or indeed anywhere, to the 
extent that they have been replaced by
technology itself.  
■ Coordinating Domestic and
International Policies
If this is the face of twenty-first-century
globalization, what is the twenty-
first-century policy response? Both
domestic and outward-oriented policies
are important. 
First, technology and trade put an even
higher premium on more education,
whether above high school or in the
industrial trades. Second, innovative
methods will be needed to help move
dislocated workers to new careers and
up a new wage ladder. Two possibilities
are on-the-job training and wage insur-
ance. Wage insurance (see Lori Kletzer
and Robert Litan10) replaces for a
period of time a fraction of the differ-
ence between the old wage at the lost
job and the new wage at the new job.
This policy encourages people to take
work in a new career, while recognizing
that a low rung on a new job ladder
probably does not pay as much as a
high rung on a career that is now gone. 
Third, for some skills, particularly in
science and technology, several “clas-
sic” market imperfections warrant more
incentives for on-the-job training to try
to forestall any job loss. Such a
“human-capital” investment tax credit
recognizes that technology skills take a
long time to develop, yet depreciate
quickly, and, moreover, that the first job
in a technical career ladder may no
longer exist in the United States, once
technology enables international trade. 
What market imperfections support the
human-capital investment tax credit?
“Free-riding” by some firms on training
costs and benefits tends to limit how
much all firms spend on training their
own workers. “Spillover” benefits for the
economy as a whole are generated from
innovative science and technology work-
ers, and workers able to adjust to new
ways of working with technology.
“Incomplete information” about what
skills might be demanded in the future
hinders workers from retooling before
their skills depreciate and their jobs are
lost. These rather familiar market imper-
fections are the rationale for the R&D
tax credit and the investment tax credit
for IT capital. In twenty-first-century
competition, a human-capital investment
tax credit offered to individuals, through
firms, and implemented by educational
institutions has even greater salience,
given the importance of innovation and
human skills in today’s international
environment. 
With respect to outward-looking poli-
cies, both macroeconomic growth
abroad and trade liberalization in ser-
vices are needed. Advocating macro-
economic policies abroad that promote
growth and development may well play
a particularly important role in raising
exports of information-technology-
enabled services because estimates
indicate that exports of U.S. services
rise more than one for one with growth
abroad and also rise with the importing
countries’level of development, as
compared with goods exports.11 Sec-
ond, more explicit and urgent attention
to services negotiations in the Doha
round of multilateral trade negotiations
is needed. Research suggests that global
gains from liberalizing services exceed
those for agriculture and manufactur-
ing. For some countries, including the
United States, GDP gains come through
more exports. For other countries,
including many developing countries,
GDP increases as all sectors of the
economy gain from more efficient pro-
vision of services.12
Bangalore is calling, and international
trade in information-technology-
enabled services offers the prospect of
deeper global integration, faster produc-
tivity growth, higher wages, and more
job creation both in the United States
and abroad. Global integration is on
“speed dial” and, because services are a
greater and rising share of the economy
and employment, far superior policy
responses are crucial. To avoid having
the U.S. economy “hang up” on the
gains from trade, policymakers must do
more to aid in the adjustment of those
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